COINTEL PRO REVISTED AND THE CONSPIIRACY TO UNDERMIND BLACK UNITY!

This Document is Exhibit 10 of U.S. Supreme Court Case No.00-9587
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEMORANDUM-46

MARCH 17, 1978

Presidential Review Memorandum NSCM/46
TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Black Africa and the U.S. Black Movement

The President has directed that a comprehensive review be made of current
developments in Black Africa from the point of view of their possible impacts
on the black movement in the United States. The review should consider:

1. Long-term tendencies of social and political developments and the degree
to which they are consistent with or contradict the U.S. interests.

2. Proposals for durable contacts between radical African leaders and
leftist leaders of the U.S. black community.

3. Appropriate steps to be taken inside and outside the country in order to
inhibit any pressure by radical African leaders and organizations on the
U.S. black community for the latter to exert influence on the policy of the
Administration toward Africa.

The President has directed that the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Africa
perform this review. The review should be forwarded to the NSC Political
Analysis Committee by April 20.

(signed)

Zbigniew Brezinski

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Commerce
The Attorney General
The Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP
FOR AFRICA STUDY RESPONSE TO PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY
REVIEW MEMORANDUM NSC-46
BLACK AFRICA AND THE
U.S. BLACK MOVEMENT

Objective of our policy toward Black Africa is to prevent social upheavals
which could radically change the political situation throughout the area. The
success or failure of our policy in the region depends on the solution international
and internal issues whose importance of the United States is on the increase.

II. A. U.S. INTERESTS IN BLACK AFRICA

A multiplicity of interests influences the U.S. attitude toward black Africa.
The most important of these interests can be summarized as follows:

1. POLITICAL
If black African states assume attitudes hostile to the U.S. national
interest, our policy toward the white regimes; which is a key element in our
relations with the black states, may be subjected by the latter to great
pressure for fundamental change. Thus the West may face a real danger of being
deprived of access to the enormous raw material resources of southern Africa
which are viral for our defense needs as well as losing control over the Cape
sea routes by which approximately 65% of Middle Eastern oil is supplied to
Western Europe.

Moreover, such a development may bring about internal
political difficulties by intensifying the activity of the black movement in
the United States itself.

It should also be borne in mind that black Africa
is an integral part of a continent where tribal and regional discord,
economic backwardness, inadequate infrastructures, drought, and famine, are
constant features of the scene. In conjunction with the artificial borders
imposed by the former colonial powers, guerilla warfare in Rhodesia and
widespread indignation against apartheid in South Africa, the above factors
provide the communist states with ample opportunities for furthering their
aims. This must necessarily redound to the detriment of U.S. political
interests.

2. ECONOMIC
Black Africa is increasingly becoming an outlet for U.S. exports and
investment. The mineral resources of the area continue to be of great value
for the normal functioning of industry in the United States and allied
countries. In 1977, U.S. direct investment in black Africa totaled about $1.8
billion and exports $2.2 billion. New prospect of substantial profits would
continue to develop in the countries concerned.

IV. BLACK AFRICA AND THE U.S. BLACK MOVEMENT

Apart from the above-mentioned factors adverse to U.S. strategic interests,
the nationalist liberation movement in black Africa can act as a catalyst
with far reaching effects on the American black community by stimulating its
organizational consolidation and by inducing radical actions. Such a result
would be likely as Zaire went the way of Angola and Mozambique.

An occurrence of the events of 1967-68 would do grievous harm to U.S. prestige,
especially in view of the concern of the present Administration with human rights issues.
Moreover, the Administration would have to take specific steps to stabilize the situation.
Such steps might be misunderstood both inside and outside the United States.

In order to prevent such a trend and protect U.S. national security interests, it would
appear essential to elaborate and carry out effective countermeasures.

1. Possibility of Joint Action By U.S. Black and African Nationalist Movement.

In elaborating U.S. policy toward black Africa, due weight must be
given to the fact that there are 25 millions American blacks whose roots are
African and who consciously or subconsciously sympathies with African
nationalism.

The living conditions of the black population should also be
taken into account. Immense advances in the field are accompanied by a
long-lasting high rate of unemployment, especially among the youth and by
poverty and dissatisfaction with government social welfare standards.

These factors taken together may provide a basis for joint actions of a concrete
nature by the African nationalist movement and the U.S. black community.
Basically, actions would take the form of demonstrations and public protests,
but the likelihood of violence cannot be excluded. There would also be
attempts to coordinate their political activity both locally and in
international organizations.

Inside the United States these actions could include protest demonstrations
against our policy toward South Africa accompanied by demand for boycotting
corporations and banks which maintain links with that country; attempts to
establish a permanent black lobby in Congress including activist leftist
radical groups and black legislators; the reemergence of Pan-African ideals;
resumption of protest marches recalling the days of Martin Luther King;
renewal of the extremist idea national idea of establishing an "African
Republic" on American soil. Finally, leftist radical elements of the black
community could resume extremist actions in the style of the defunct Black
Panther Party.

Internationally, damage could be done to the United States by coordinated
activity of African states designed to condemn U.S. policy toward South
Africa, and initiate discussions on the U.S. racial issue at the United
Nations where the African representation constitutes a powerful bloc with
about one third of all the votes.

A menace to U.S. economic interests, though not a critical one, could be
posed by a boycott by Black African states against American companies which
maintain contact with South Africa and Rhodesia. If the idea of economic
assistance to black Americans shared by some African regimes could be
realized by their placing orders in the United States mainly with companies
owned by blacks, they could gain a limited influence on the U.S. black
community.

In the above context, we must envisage the possibility, however remote, that
black Americans interested in African affairs may refocus their attention on
the Arab-Israeli conflict. Taking into account; the African descent of
American blacks it is reasonable to anticipate that their sympathies would
lie with the Arabs who are closer to them in spirit and in some case related
to them by blood. Black involvement in lobbying to support the Arabs may lead
to serious dissention between American black and Jews. The likelihood of
extremist actions by either side is negligible, but the discord may bring about
tension in the internal political climate of the United States.

3. Political options

In the context of long-term strategy, the United States can not afford a
radical change in the fundamentals of its African policy, which is designed
for maximum protection of national security. In the present case, emphasis is
laid on the importance of Black Africa for U.S. political, economic and
military interests.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In weighing the range of U.S. interests in Black Africa, basic
recommendations arranged without intent to imply priority are:

1. Specific steps should be taken with the help of appropriate government
agencies to inhibit coordinated activity of the Black Movement in the United
States.

2. Special clandestine operations should be launched by the CIA to generate
mistrust and hostility in American and world opinion against joint activity
of the two forces, and to cause division among Black African radical
national groups and their leaders.

3. U.S. embassies to Black African countries specially interested in southern
Africa must be highly circumspect in view of the activity of certain
political circles and influential individuals opposing the objectives and
methods of U.S. policy toward South Africa. It must be kept in mind that the
failure of U.S. strategy in South Africa would adversely affect American
standing throughout the world. In addition, this would mean a significant
diminution of U.S. influence in Africa and the emergence of new difficulties
in our internal situation due to worsening economic prospects.

4. The FBI should mount surveillance operations against Black African
representatives and collect sensitive information on those, especially at the
U.N., who oppose U.S. policy toward South Africa. The information should
include facts on their links with the leaders of the Black movement in the
United States, thus making possible at least partial neutralization of the
adverse effects of their activity.

V. TRENDS IN THE AMERICAN BLACK MOVEMENT

In connection with our African policy, it is highly important to evaluate
correctly the present state of the Black movement in the Untied States and
basing ourselves on all available information, to try to devise a course for
its future development. Such an approach is strongly suggested by our
perception of the fact that American Blacks form a single ethnic group
potentially capable of causing extreme instability in our strategy toward
South Africa. This may lead to critical differences between the United States
and Black Africa in particular. It would also encourage the Soviet Union to
step up its interference in the region. Finally, it would pose a serious
threat to the delicate structure of race relations within the United States.
All the above considerations give rise to concern for the future security of
the United States.

Since the mid-1960s, when legislation on the human rights was passed and Martin Luther King
murdered, federal and local measures to improve black welfare have been taken, as a result of
which the U.S. black movement has undergone considerable changes.

The principle changes are as follows:

*Social and economic issues have supplanted political aims as the main
preoccupations of the movement. and actions formerly planned on a nationwide
scale are now being organized locally.

*Fragmentation and a lack of organizational unity within the movement.

*Sharp social stratification of the Black population and lack of policy
options which could reunite them.

*Want of a national leader of standing comparable to Martin Luther King.

B. THE RANGE OF POLICY OPTIONS

The concern for the future security of the United States makes necessary the
range of policy options. Arranged without intent imply priority they are:

(a) to enlarge programs, within the framework of the present budget, for the
improvement of the social and economic welfare of American Blacks in order
to ensure continuing development of present trends in the Black movement;

(b) to elaborate and bring into effect a special program designed to
perpetuate division in the Black movement and neutralize the most active
groups of leftist radical organizations representing different social strata
of the Black community: to encourage division in Black circles;

(c) to preserve the present climate which inhibits the emergence from within
the Black leadership of a person capable of exerting nationwide appeal;

(d) to work out and realize preventive operations in order to impede durable
ties between U.S Black organizations and radical groups in African states;

(e) to support actions designed to sharpen social stratification in the Black
community which would lead to the widening and perpetuation of the gap
between successful educated Blacks and the poor, giving rise to growing
antagonism between different Black groups and a weakening of the movement as
a whole.

(f) to facilitate the greatest possible expansion of Black business by
granting government contracts and loans with favorable terms to Black
businessmen;

(g) to take every possible means through the AFL-CIO leaders to counteract
the increasing influence of Black labor organizations which function in all
major unions and in particular, the National Coalition of Black Trade Union
and its leadership including the creation of real preference for adverse and
hostile reaction among White trade unionists to demands for improvement of
social and economic welfare of the Blacks;

(h) to support the nomination at federal and local levels of loyal Black
public figures to elective offices, to government agencies and the Court.

This would promote the achievement of a twofold purpose:

first, it would be easier to control the activity of loyal black representatives within
existing institution;

second, the idea of an independent black political party now under dicussion within
black leadership circles would soon lose all support.