Pentagon "Rapid Reaction Media Team" for Iraq

National Security Archives
By Joyce Battle

A White Paper and PowerPoint briefing obtained through the Freedom of Information Act and published today by the National Security Archive describe Pentagon planning for a "Rapid Reaction Media Team" that was to be a critical part of an information campaign "during [the] pre-hostilities phase of the Iraq mission." As a "bridge" after the overthrow of Iraq's government and before the establishment of an "'Iraqi Free Media' network," the rapid reaction team would create narratives leading Iraqis to feel, Pentagon planners enthused, like North Koreans who turned off state TV at night and in the morning turned on "the rich fare of South Korean TV . . . as their very own." Foreshadowing the unfolding of the U.S. government's Iraq media policy, preliminary work would not come cheap - Defense Department planners recommended paying two U.S. consultants $140,000 each for a campaign of six months duration.

The White Paper was prepared in January 2003 by two Defense Department offices - Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, and Near East and South Asian Affairs (Special Plans). The first is in charge of psychological warfare; the second was set up to covertly plan for the invasion of Iraq. As reported by Knight Ridder Newspapers, by mid-2002 it was clear to veteran Pentagon workers that President Bush was "methodically preparing an invasion to oust" Saddam Hussein. A planning unit - later referred to as the "Office of Special Plans" -- was to coordinate "the non-military and political aspects of any campaign, as opposed to drawing up actual invasion plans." More details of the unit's activities have subsequently become known, particularly through a July 9, 2004 report by the Senate Intelligence Committee and the efforts of Senator Carl Levin [D-Mich.] and his staff. On October 21, 2004 the senator released a report focusing on the activities of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, which oversaw these secretive planning activities, and Levin was instrumental in obtaining the February 2007 declassification of what he called a "devastating" report by the Defense Department's inspector general, who said the office's role in developing and disseminating alternative intelligence analyses on Iraq - directed by Under Secretary Douglas Feith, and authorized by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz - was "inappropriate."

According to the media White Paper, "civil-military transition of the new Iraq to a broad representative government" would take "1-2 years," and the U.S. government would establish - in 12 months - an information system that would serve "as a model for free media in the Arab world." To ensure that the message would be controlled, Iraq was to be provided with a "Temporary Media Commissioner" to regulate against "hate media". He or she would operate in a receptive environment: the team would "identify the media infrastructure that we need left intact, and work with CENTCOM targeteers to find alternative ways of disabling key sites." (Evidently the Baghdad headquarters of Arab satellite network al-Jazeera was not part of "the media infrastructure that we need left intact.")

Iraqi, American, and "one or two" British media experts would provide information to Iraqis about U.S. intentions and operations. Their mission would include preventing Iraq's "trifurcation" while giving Iraqis hope for the future. "Hand-Picked" Iraqis would provide "the face" for the USG campaign. The team was to "[t]ranslate USG policy and thematic guidance into information campaign (news and entertainment)." Plans for "Entertainment and News Magazine programming" ranked "Hollywood" above the news. Though U.S. policy was officially opposed to Iraq's geographical disintegration, its internal divisions would be emphasized: a new weekly publication would have separate sections for Shi'a, Sunni, and Kurdish articles.

As Pentagon planners saw it, the themes of the "strategic information campaign" were to be crimes of the old regime, and a bright new day. They included "Mine awareness," "Re-starting the Oil," "Justice and rule of law topics," "Humanitarian assistance . . . care and management of population and internal displaced persons," "Political prisoners and atrocity interviews," "WMD disarmament," and "Saddam's palaces and opulence." Unfortunately for the architects of the war, however, the world has found uncontrolled media to view Iraq's actual post-invasion reality -- Abu Ghraib, IED's, chlorine bombs, sabotage, disappearances, torture, botched executions, a dysfunctional legal system, a collapsed civil infrastructure, massive casualties, and an exodus numbering 2 million refugees, for whom American humanitarian aid has been effectively nonexistent -- all overseen from the USG's privileged enclave in the Green Zone. The 21st century universe of alternative media, freelancers, cell phones, video uploads, bloggers, and satellite news outlets was not, evidently, anticipated by the Pentagon, and is well beyond its control.

The U.S. government's Iraq media policy did enrich certain defense contractors, including the Rendon Group, which also provided propaganda support for the U.S. leading up to the first Iraq war, Scientific Applications International Corporation - also known for creating a job, at the Defense Department's behest, for Shaha Ali Riza, Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz's friend - and the Lincoln Group, which experienced a meteoric rise in fortune courtesy of the Pentagon's largesse. Consistent failure to achieve stated goals has been no obstacle. [also here, here and here]

As for Iraq, it has been provided with media policies that resemble, according to the media watchdog International Press Institute, "those of autocratic regimes in the region, and not those of an aspiring democracy." In the state of anarchy imposed on Iraq by the U.S. invasion, more than 200 journalists have died, including, by April 2007, at least 27 working for the U.S.-created Iraqi Media Network. Three of them were killed by U.S. forces. For reporters still striving, against great odds, to describe the conditions confronted by its people, Iraq is now, according to Reporters Without Borders, the "most dangerous country" in the world.

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Documents
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Document 1: U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict; and Office of the Assistant Secretary, Near East and South Asian Affairs (Special Plans) White Paper Entitled, "'Rapid Reaction Media Team' Concept;" January 16, 2003; Includes Briefing Slides.
Source: Declassified through the Freedom of Information Act

Recommends creation of a "Rapid Reaction Media Team" using "hand-picked" American, British, and Iraqi media experts to prepare for the establishment of an "Iraqi Free Media" following the invasion of Iraq. Discusses the team's mission, personnel requirements, required tasks, and plans for "on-the-shelf" programming, and outlines topics and themes to be disseminated to the Iraqi public.

Document 2: U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector General Audit Entitled, "Acquisition: Contracts Awarded for the Coalition Provisional Authority by the Defense Contracting Command-Washington," March 18, 2004.

Reports on actions taken by the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance/Coalition Provisional Authority - the entities created to govern Iraq following the U.S. invasion of March 2003 - and the Defense Contracting Command-Washington, which was in charge of administrating private sector activity in support of the invasion and occupation - when awarding contracts. The inspector general undertook this inquiry after the Defense Contract Audit Agency "found irregularities in both the award and administration of the contracts" and recommended an in-depth review. During the time span under consideration in the audit, the Defense Contracting Command awarded 24 contracts, valued at $122.5 million, of which 13, valued at $111 million, were sole-source (non-competitive.) The audit, which categorizes "media support" as "humanitarian assistance," discusses a contract for the Iraqi Free Media Program that was granted on a no-bid basis to the Science Applications International Corporation. The Iraqi program is discussed in detail on pages 10, 16-17, 21-22, 26-29, and 33-36.

Document 3: U.S. Department of Defense, Inspector General Report Entitled, "Review of the Pre-Iraqi War Activities of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy," February 9, 2007.

The review underlying this report was performed at the request of Sen. Pat Roberts [R-Kans.], Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and Sen. Carl Levin [D-MIch.], ranking minority member of the committee, because of substantive questions raised about some of the conclusions of the July 7, 2004 report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence entitled, "Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Pre-War Intelligence Assessments on Iraq," particularly in regard to the possible politicization of intelligence. The inspector general's review found that "The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy developed, produced, and then disseminated alternative intelligence assessments on the Iraq and al-Qaida relationship, which included some conclusions that were inconsistent with the consensus of the Intelligence Community, to senior decision-makers. While such actions were not illegal or unauthorized, the actions were, in our opinion, inappropriate . . . " Therefore, "the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy did not provide 'the most accurate analysis of intelligence' to senior decision-makers." (p. ii)